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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18131 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Appellant on a written agreement made 
between the parties whereby, for compensation received, 
Respondent, Knight Land Corporation, promised to pay to 
Appellant, Robert Fredericksen, the sum of $10,000.00 plus 10% 
thereon or, at Appellant's option, convey to him sufficient 
acreage of certain property known as Jeremy Ranch at a rate of 
$85.00 per acre to satisfy said payment obligation. 
II. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
entered judgment of "no cause of action" against Appellant on all 
claims set forth in his Complaint based on a Stipulated Statement 
of Facts and various legal memoranda submitted by the parties. 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse the judgment of the 
District Court and to remand for entering of judgment in favor of 
Appellant pursuant to the claims in his Complaint. 
, 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 1st day of November, 1961, Respondent, 
Knight Land Corporation, as buyer, entered into an agreement with 
East Salt Lake Investment Company (ESLIC), as seller, whereby 
Respondent was given the option to purchase approximately 16,500 
acres of land known as the Jeremy Ranch (R. 231). Pursuant to 
said agreement, Respondent took possession of the entire Jeremy 
Ranch property, received the right to purchase said property for 
$1,400,000.00, and agreed to make annual installment payments to 
ESLIC toward satisfaction of said purchase price (R. 231, 244-
264). However, Respondent did not hold nor could it deliver 
title to any of the property to any other party until money was 
received by ESLIC sufficient to release a portion of the property 
( R. 5 9 ) • 
Sometime prior to the 31st day of December, 1963, Appellant 
contributed $10,000.00 to and became a limited partner in a 
partnership known as Huntington Park Investment Company. Said 
partnership entered into an agreement with Respondent whereby the 
Partnership would make the downpayment on Respondent's contract 
with ESLIC and pay by installments certain sums to Respondent as 
consideration for conveyance from Respondent of approximately 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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5,000 acres of Jeremy Ranch. After making the required down 
payment, the Partnership defaulted in its agreement with 
Respondent (R. 231-232). 
On the 31st day of December, 1963, Respondent entered into a 
written Agreement with Appellant and other members of the 
Partnership by the terms of which Appellant agreed to release his 
interest in and to the Jeremy Ranch property, and Respondent 
agreed to pay to Appellant the sum of $10,000.00 together with 
10% thereon (R. 233). A copy of said Agreement was received in 
evidence, attached to the Stipulation of Facts (R. 276-285). 
Said Agreement provides, inter alia: That Appellant had 
"individually" paid to Respondent $10,000.00; that Respondent 
promised to repay that sum together with 10% thereon from "50 
percent of the gross profits actually realized by Knight from the 
resale of lands acquired by Knight from the Jeremy Ranch"; that 
"all sums received by Knight from the resale of any of the Jeremy 
Ranch land in excess of $85.00 per acre shall be considered to be 
gross profits"; that Appellant acknowledged familiarity with the 
terms of Respondent's contract with ESLIC because of which 
Appellant's right to repayment was conditioned upon the payments 
to ESLIC being kept current allowing the release of resellable 
land to Respondent; that if all sums had not been advanced by 
Respondent by July 1, 1968, Appellant "may request Knight to 
convey . • • sufficient of the acreage theretofore released to 
Knight . • at the rate of $85.00 per acre to satisfy and 
discharge any remaining unpaid balance"; and that any breaching 
party thereto should pay all court costs and a reasonable 
3 
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attorney's fee incurred for enforcement of the agreement (R. 276-
285), Sections 1, 2, 3, 8, 16). 
Between the 31st day of December, 1963 and the 8th day of 
May, 1970, there were a number of sales of the land by 
Respondent, all of which were for more than $85.00 per acre. 
Said sales were necessitated by the annual payments due under the 
ESLIC agreement. Each year, only so much property was released 
and sold as would provide Respondent with sufficient funds to 
meet the annual obligation. All proceeds from the said sales 
were completely exhausted by costs of sales or in satisfaction of 
the ESLIC obligation (R. 239). In fact, there were no proceeds 
received by the Respondent from any of these sales which were not 
required by ESLIC as a condition to the release of the sold 
property. In each instance of sale, the deed either went 
directly from ESLIC to the third-party buyer or was transferred 
through Respondent immediately to the third-party buyer, and the 
money similarly was transferred either directly from said buyer 
to ESLIC, or through Respondent immediately to ESLIC. Respondent 
did not ever have control of the proceeds of said sales, nor 
could it deliver title to the released properties to Appellant 
( R. 5 9 I 2 3 6 ) • 
On the 8th day of May, 1970, Respondent entered into a 
written agreement with Emigration Land Company (Emigration) by 
the terms of which Respondent sold on contract all of its 
interest in Jeremy Ranch for the sum of $2,100,000.00. The 
remaining acreage was approximately 12,500 acres. Pursuant to 
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that agreement, Respondent received the sum of $500,00.00 as 
downpayment on or about the date of execution of the contract and 
payments of $75,000.00 in 1971 and 1972. In 1973, Respondent 
discounted the balance of the purchase price which was thereupon 
paid in f u 11 ( R. 2 3 7- 2 3 8 ) • 
Upon receipt of the $500,000.00 downpayment from Emigration 
pursuant to the aforementioned agreement of sale, Respondent had, 
for the first time, more proceeds than were required to pay to 
ESLIC on the option obligation (R. 59, 60). However, the subject 
Agreement with Appellant allowed Respondent to "retain the first 
$85.00 per acre paid" on each sale before any gross profits would 
be realized (R. 277, Section 2(c)). Appellant was only to be 
paid out of 50 percent of the gross profits of each sale. 
Furthermore, Responent had no title to any of the property until 
October, 1974, at which time Emigration transferred 10 acres to 
Respondent in final settlement of the contract balance (R. 55). 
Neither Appellant nor any other partners of the Partnership 
received any sums of money or any land from Respondent pursuant 
to the subject Agreement prior to the year 1973 (R. 194, 
paragraph l(x)). In 1974, former partners of Appellant, also 
parties to the subject Agreement, were paid certain sums of money 
and given land by Respondent for settlement of a civil action 
filed by those individuals on the subject Agreement (R. 233-234, 
paragraph 5(a-d). Appellant asserted before the Court herein 
that prior to said settlement, he had been encouraged by 
Respondent's agent, James L. Knight, not to become a party to 
5 
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that lawsuit and was verbally assured that he would be paid (R. 
3 32) . 
After numerous attempts to receive satisfaction of the 
contractual debt and subsequent to a period of convalescing from 
a severe heart attack, Appellant caused a written demand to be 
served upon Respondent on the 7th day of February, 1978. A copy 
of said demand was received in evidence, attached to the 
Stipulation of Facts (R. 324-327). In said demand, Appellant 
exercised his contractual option to request payment in the form 
of land as provided in the subject Agreement (R. 41, paragraph 
20). Appellant at all times performed all of the stipulations, 
conditions, and agreements stated in the subject Agreement in the 
manner therein specified. However, Respondent refused either to 
pay the sum of $10,000.00 together with 10% thereon or to convey 
to Appellant sufficient acreage to discharge the indebtedness. 
On the 20th day of March, 1978, Appellant filed this action 
1n the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County 
against Respondent praying for conveyance of property, or in the 
alternative, for repayment of the $10,000.00 plus 10% thereon. 
Pursuant to stipulation of the respective counsel, a joint 
Stipulation of Facts was submitted to the Court (R. 231-327) 
followed by various memoranda of law and argument. The parties 
agreed to dismiss the action against James L. Knight 
individually. The District Court, Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
awarded Respondent a judgment of "no cause of action" against 
Appellant on all causes of action set forth in his Complaint, 
finding that said "claims are barred by the statute of 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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1 imitations" ( R. 38 7-3 8 8, 391-3 9 6). 
judgment. 
Appellant appeals from said 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. APPELLANT'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE PROPERTY FROM RES-
PONDENT SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
Section 3 of the subject Agreement begins: 
If Knight has not reimbursed each of the Parties of 
the First Part in full for all sums advanced by him 
as aforesaid, plus 10 percent, by July 1, 1968, each 
or any of the Parties of the First Part may request 
Knight to reconvey to said requesting party sufficient 
of the acreage theretofore released to Knight from 
the Jeremy Ranch, at the rate of $85.00 per acre to 
fully satisfy and discharge any remaining unpaid balance 
to said requesting party. 
It does not, however, stipulate as to when this election 
should take place. When a provision in a contract requires that 
an act be performed without specifying any time, Utah law implies 
that it is to be done within a reasonable time under the 
circumstances. Bradford v. Alvey & So~s, 621 P.2d 1240, 1242 
(Utah 1980). 
A "reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is 
necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the 
contract or duty require should be done in a particular case." 
Commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 10 Utah 342, 173 P.2d 277, 
281 (1946). The only contractual requirements for Appellant's 
exercise was that he be not fully reimbursed by Respondent before 
July 1, 1968, and that he choose acreage from property 
7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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theretofore released. Thus, the option came into existence on 
that date. 
As stipulated and admitted by Respondent, any attempted 
exercise by Appellant of the option prior to October, 1974 would 
have been undisputedly futile. Although title may have on 
occasion technically passed through Respondent, it had no 
alienable title to the property which it could give Plaintiff (R. 
235, paragraph 6(b)). In May, 1970, Respondent became a 
beneficiary to a Trust Deed executed for the purchase of the 
property by Emigration (& 238, paragraph 11). Respondent still 
had no legal title to the property such as could be transferred 
to Appellant in lieu of installment payments. The first date to 
which Respondent admits holding clear title to any of the 
property isf approximately October, 1974, when it received 10 
acres as a settlement with Emigration {R. 240, paragraph 19(a)). 
Although October of 1974 was the first time that Appellant could 
effectively exercise any portion of its option, sufficient 
acreage to satisfy the full obligation was yet unavailable. 
Between 1970 and 1973, the Respondent was involved in a 
lawsuit with other parties to the subject Agreement. Those 
parties were also seeking payment in land or money pursuant to 
their rights under the Agreement. At that time, Appellant was 
encouraged by Respondent not to join in that action and was given 
assurances that he would be paid in full if he would be patient. 
In view of the facts that Respondent had no property until late 
1974, that Responent had pursuaded Appellant not to join the 
earlier action promising full payment later, and that Appellant 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was thereafter temporarily incapacitated by a serious heart 
attack, Appellant's demand of February 7, 1978 must be considered 
to be an exercise of that option within a reasonable time. The 
circumstances of this case dictate that a reasonable period must 
extend at least until the option holder is aware of either the 
ability of the obliger to perform or the obliger's intent not to 
do so. Any finding of the trial court to the contrary must be 
overturned as against the evidence. 
Before the lower Court, Respondent construed Section 3 as 
giving Appellant the right to request property only from acreage 
released prior to July 1, 1968, regardless of when said option is 
exercised. The Section is not unambiguous, but Appellant asserts 
that its intended and more logical meaning is to allow Appellant 
to request property from acreage released prior to that request. 
The date of July 1, 1968 clearly indicates the date upon which 
the option is first exercisable, but does not limit the property 
which may be chosen. Appellant has a contractual right to select 
from property, "theretofore" released by ESLIC, in lieu of 
repayment from Respondent. That right first came into existence 
on July 1, 1968 and continued as an available option for a 
reasonable time. 
Appellant has reason to believe that Respondent presently 
has or has had, during the pendency of this lawsuit, title to a 
certain amount of the subject property (R. 240, paragraph 
19(b,c)). However, Respondent has not been willing to disclose 
the description of the specific property so held. Appellant, 
9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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thus, .1s entitled to have Security Title Company, the escrow 
holder, select from the acreage held by Respondent "sufficient of 
the acreage .•. to fully satisfy and discharge any remaining 
unpaid balance" to Appellant (R. 278, Section 3). 
1. If 129 4 acres are not presently available, Appellant 
has a right to money damages equal to the fair market 
value of the unavailable acreage at Jeremy Ranch. 
Respondent, at various times through this lawsuit, claimed 
that it presently owns few, if any, acres of the Jeremy Ranch 
property. If true, specific performance of the option provision 
in Section 3 of the Agreement would be impossible. 
[S]ince equity does not undertake to do a vain and 
useless thing, and does not grant a decree of specific 
performance when it appears that the Defendant is 
unable to comply with his contract - no decree of 
specific performance will issue against a vendor in 
a land contract who has no title or interest in the 
land that he contracted to convey .... 
71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, §126 (1973). 
Applying the rule to an option contract in Lowe v. Har!!!!!!!.' 
115 P.2d 297, 302 (Or. 1941), the court said, "specific 
performance will not be deemed against an optionor who is not 
able, for want of title, to comply with the option contract." 
In this case, however, Respondent admits to its present 
ownership of various interests in the Jeremy Ranch property but 
is allegedly unable to convey the full title or the full amount 
of proprty which it contracted to sell (R. 240, paragraph 
19(b,c)). Nevertheless, Appellant may elect to take any acreage 
to which Respondent currently holds title; the remainder of the 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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judgment will be left to remedies at law. 
Specific Performance, §§116, 117 (1973). 
71 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Remedies at law for the vendor's breach of a contract 
include the purchaser's loss of bargain plus any special damages 
foreseeable at the time of contract. The measure of damages for 
breach of contract is described as "the amount which would have 
been received if the contract had been performed, which means the 
value of the contract, including the profits and advantages which 
are its direct results and fruits." 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §47 
{1965). This general rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Ste_!!art v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 218 P. 959, 961 (1923), 
and applied to land sale contracts in Smith v. W~, 564 P.2d 
771, 772 (Utah 1977). 
The damages caused by breach of contract are to be measured 
as of the date of the breach. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 
368 P.2d 597, 601 (1962). Appellant's demand for acreage was 
made in February, 1978 (R. 241, paragraph 20). It was not until 
that date that Respondent breached its promise to convey land. 
Since Respondent breached its contractual obligation to convey 
129.4 acres to Appellant, and it contends that it does not now 
have any interest in the Ranch beyond a few acres, Appellant is 
entitled to any acreage currently owned by Respondent plus a 
money judgment for the fair market value as of the date of breach 
of the average remaining property such as would total 129.4 
acres. Both Appellant and Respondent agree that as of February, 
1978, the approximate value of the property in question was 
$375.00 per acre (R. 241, paragraph 21). 
11 
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2. AEpellant's claim for land or fai~ ~ark~t value thereof 
is not barred by the statute of 11m1tat1ons. 
Respondent's only defense to this action is that the statute 
of limitations has lapsed and left Appellant without a legal 
remedy (R. 209). Section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended) prescribes "an action upon any contract, 
obligation or liability foundeo upon an instrument in writing, 
except those mentioned in the preceding section" to be brought 
within six years. The statute of limitations begins to accrue on 
the date of the breach of contract, not the date on which it was 
signed or the date that performance provided therein might be 
completed. 
This Court declared that the statute of limitations does 
"not begin to run until a suit or cause of action exists," 
Kimbal 1 v. _!icCo r _!:i ck, 8 0 Utah 18 9, 2 5 9 P. 313, 31 7 ( 19 2 6). The 
Court dealt with the question as to when a cause of a~tion 
accrues in State Tax Commission v. Spanish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 
p. 2d 5 7 5' 5 7 7 ( 19 40) : 
Ordinarily, a cause of action for a debt begins to run 
when the debt is due and payable because at that time 
an action can be maintained to enforce it. But when 
some controlling statute or a contract existing 
between the parties provides that an additional 
thing be done before action may be brought, such as 
a statutory provision that a return must be filed, 
or, as in some insurance contracts, a provision 
that suit may not be brought before a certain time 
after the claimed loss, the statute of limitations 
does not start to run until the time when suit may 
be maintained even though interest on the amount of 
the liability may begin to run from the time it is 
due and payable. (Emphasis added) 
12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Accordingly, a cause of action on a contract debt does not accrue 
against the debtor until all of the requirements for payment to 
the creditor have been met. 
Appellant's contractual right to request property in 
satisfaction of any outstanding amount due and owing from 
Respondent first arose on July 1, 1968 (R. 278, Section 3). The 
Agreement gave Appellant the option to choose from any property 
theretofore released by ESLIC. Each year from 1964 to 1967, 
Respondent secured a release of property from ESLIC. However, 
these annual releases were only for so much property as would 
garner proceeds on resale to pay each annual payment due to 
ESLIC. In fact, no releases would have been given at all if 
ESLIC were not given all proceeds (other than transaction costs). 
Transfer of the property through Respondent to the third party 
would not be made until and unless all proceeds were paid to 
ESLIC. 
From 1964 through 1970, Respondent was unable to deliver 
title to any of the property to Appellant. There was no property 
which had been released by ESLIC but not simultaneously sold to a 
third party to meet the annual payment obligation on the 1961 
Agreement (R. 236, paragraph 7). Appellant's right to select 
property first arose in 1968 since Respondent had not repaid him 
in full. But his election right was then hollow; there was no 
available land which had yet been released to Respondent. 
Section 3 required an affirmative "request" to be made by 
Appellant to obligate Respondent to convey released property. 
Until such request was made, Respondent had no duty to transfer 
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title. A cause of action could not accrue until this last 
r~quirement was fulfilled by Appellant. The statute of 
limitations could likewise not begin to run until the cause of 
action acer ued. 
B. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT. 
In the event that Appellant's claim for property pursuant to 
Section 3 of the subject Agreement is conclusively found to be 
without merit, Appellant is entitled to money damages from 
Respondent for breach of contract. 
Section 2 of the subject Agreement states: 
2. As consideration of the release given by each of 
the parties of the first part, as set forth herein 
below, Knight agrees to pay to Security Title Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as escrow holder for Parties of the 
First Part 50 percent of the gross profits actually 
realized by Knight from the resale of lands acquired 
by Knight from the Jeremy Ranch until each of the 
Parties of the First Part has been repaid the sum of 
money advanced by him, as is set forth above, plus 
10 percent thereof, with said repayment to be made 
without interest. The term "gross profits", as used 
herein, shall be computed as follows: 
(a) The cost of the land to Knight shall be con-
sidered to be $85.00 per acre, which is the average 
per acre price Knight has contracted to pay for the 
entire 16,500 acres. 
(b) All sums received by Knight from the resale 
of any of the Jeremy Ranch land in excess of $85.00 per 
acre shall be considered to be gross profits. 
(c) Knight will retain the first $85.00 per acre 
paid as his cost of the land and 50 percent of the 
gross profits, to reimburse him for legal expense, 
development expense, sales expense, etc. 
(d) The other 50 percent of the gross profit 
will be paid to Security Title Company of Salt Lake 
City, as escrow holder for the use and benefit of the 
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Parties of the First Part, and said escrow holder will 
be i~structed to forthwith distribute pro rata all sums 
received by the escrow holder to Parties of the First 
Part. The monies so disbursed by the escrow holder 
shall be pro rated among the Parties of the First Part, 
so that each of said parties receives the same pro-
portion of each disbursement as the money paid by him 
to Knight, as aforesaid, bears to the total money paid 
by all of the Parties of the First Part to Knight. 
Respondent admits to the validity of the original debt and 
its nonpayment thereof (R. 239-240) and asserts the statute of 
limitations as its sole defense (R. 209). 
1. Appellant's claim for $10,000.00 plus ten percent 
thereon is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
The subject Agreement provides that Respondent was obligated 
to repay to Appellant $10,000.00 plus 10% thereon only out of the 
proceeds from the resale of Jeremy Ranch land (R. 282), Section 
12). If no sales were made nor proceeds received, Respondent had 
no obligation to Appellant. Furthermore, Respondent's obligation 
to Appellant was only to be repaid out of "50 percent of the 
gross profits actually realized" ~y Respondent from each resale 
of land (R. 277, Section 2). Finally, Appellant was made to 
acknowledge the terms of Respondent's underlying contract with 
ESLIC, which required annual principal payments of $160 ,000.00, 
and that unless Respondent made those payments, Appellant would 
receive no repayment except from pre-default gross profits (R. 
279, Section 5). 
Appellant could not maintain a suit for the breach of this 
contract until and unless (1) Respondent continued to make timely 
payments to ESLIC, (2) Respondent was able to resell portions of 
the land released by ESLIC, (3) proceeds from the resales would 
15 
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include gross profits, and (4) those proceeds were not otherwise 
required to fulfill payment obligations to ESLIC. Until these 
requirements were met, Respondent was not obligated to repay 
Appellant, nor could Appellant enforce the contract through lgal 
action. 
The first proceeds free from obligation to the underlying 
contract with ESLIC were received in the sale of land to 
Emigration in 1970. All sales prior to that date were of only so 
much land as would be released by ESLIC to generate sufficient 
funds to allow Respondent to make its annual $160,000.00 
payments. 
In the lower Court, Respondent asserted that because each 
resale of property, beginning in 1964, produced proceeds in 
excess of $85.00 per acre, and since none of said proceeds were 
paid to Appellant, each resale also constituted an actual breach 
of contract and started the statute of limitations to run (R. 
214-217). This contention ignores the clear intent of the 
contracting parties as evidenced in the Agreement. The paramount 
concern of the parties was to keep the contract with ESLIC 
current. Without the option on the land, neither party could 
enjoy anticipated profits. The apparent purpose of Section 5 of 
the Agreement was the acknowledgment of the primacy of that ESLIC 
obligation. 
In May of 1970, Respondent received $500,000.00 down and a 
schedule of installments for the outstanding balance of 
$1,600,000.00 pursuant to the sale of 12,500 acres to Emigration. 
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This was the first receipt of proceeds by Respondent from the 
resale of land, which proceeds were not required to be 
immediately transferred to ESLIC. However, Appellant was not 
entitled to be repaid until gross profits on the sale were 
actually realized (R. 277, Section 2). According to the 
Agreement, Respondent was to "retain the first $85.00 per acre 
and 50 percent of the gross profits" before Appellant was 
entitled to any payment. Defined as "sums received ... in 
excess of $85.00 per acre," no gross profits would be realized on 
the 1970 sale until $1,062,500.00 was received from Emigration. 
Appellant, therefore, was not entitled to any repayment, nor 
could the Agreement be considered breached by Respondent until 
the first realization of "free" gross profits in 1973. 
Considering the date of actual breach, the institution of these 
proceedings in 1978 is well within the six-year statute of 
limitations. 
2. Any potential disabling statute of limitations tolled 
with Respondent's payment to Appellant's co-obligees 
under the subject Agreement. 
The earliest time a breach of contract by Respondent could 
have occurred was 1973 when "free" gross profits were first 
received. However, in 1974, two of Appellant's fellow investors 
were paid pursuant to the same contract. Utah Code Annotated 
§78-12-44, 1953, as amended, states that: 
In any case founed on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or 
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have 
been made, an action may be brought within the 
17 
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period prescribed for the same after such payment 
acknowledgment or promise .... 
Payments pursuant to litigation were made to J. Kent Buehler 
and Richard D. Madsen in 1974, within the six-year statute of 
limitations of any possible breach {R. 233-234, 286-289). The 
payments were made by Respondent with a written settlement 
pursuant to the same Agreement that is contested in this case. 
Madsen and Buehler were partners with Appellant at the time the 
original debt arose, and all were treated as an entity entitled 
"Parties of the First Part" throughout the Agreement. 
In D i x on v • Ba r t 1 e t t , 1 7 6 C a 1 . 5 7 2 , 1 6 9 P . 2 3 6 ( 1 9 1 7 )_, a 
letter acknowledging a contract debt addressed to one partner was 
held sufficient to toll the statute against all the partners. In 
Krause v. S2urgeon, 256 S.W. 1072 (Mo. App. 1923), part payment 
to one of two joint holders of a note was sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations against both holders. In Hiscock v. 
Hiscock, 240 N.W. 50 (Mich. 1932), payment t() one of several co-
owners of a mortgage which had been barred by the statute of 
limitations acted to revive the mortgage to all mortgagees. 
The payments of cash and land accompanied by written 
settlements to Madsen and Buehler tolled the statute of 
limitations against Appellant. Thus, the period of limitation 
began anew in 1974. The action brought in 1978 was within the 
six-year period. 
3. Even if applicable, the statute of limitations would bar 
only a portion of Appellant's claim. 
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Section 4 of the subject Agreement allows Appellant to 
"continue to receive his pro-rated share of the gross prof its 
until he has been reimbursed if he has not been fully reimbursed 
by July 1, 1968." The alternative opinion was to recover 
sufficient land at the rate of $85.00 per acre to satisfy his 
account. The language of this alternative requires a "request to 
reconvey" whereas the desire to continue in profit participation 
necessitates no such notice. No request was made by Appellant 
prior to the 1978 demand, and Respondent apparently assumed 
Appellant's election was to wait for payment from gross profits. 
Section 13 of the Agreement anticipates Respondent selling 
its interest in the property "as an entity" and outlines 
Appellant's rights in such a sale. The sale to Emigration on May 
8, 1970 was, indeed, the sale of Respondent's entire remaining 
interest in the Ranch and would apparently be subject to this 
section. However, the particular clauses of this section specify 
sales consummated by December 31, 1968: 
(c) If Knight receives an installment sale contract 
which would be paid off in full before December 31, 
1968, then Knight will, from each payment he receives, 
pay to First Parties (i.e., Fredericksen), as afore-
said, the same proportion of the amount due to each of 
them as payment made to Knight bears to the total 
purchase price to Knight. 
(d) If the installment payments are accepted by 
Knight extending the term of payment beyond 1969, 
then Knight will, nevertheless, pay First Parties 
in full from the funds so received by December 31, 
1968. The annual payments shall be equal. 
In the lower Court, Respondent contended that although 
inapplicable to the Emigration sale, subsection (d) offers 
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guidance in the interpretation of the intent of the parties to 
not "string out the payments for the Plaintiff." Certainly, the 
Agreement was not intended to indefinitely postpone payments to 
Appellant. Neither was the intent to force full payment to 
Appellant and his co-associates upon the initial installment 
payment which may have had a crippling effect on Respondent's 
cash flow. This factor is especially relevant in light of 
Responent's admission that there were liens against the property 
exceeding the $500,000.00 down payment made by Emigration in May, 
1 9 7 0 ( R. 2 3 7 , par a g r a p h 1 0 ) . 
The only reasonable interpretation of Sections 2, 4, and 13 
extended to 1970 and beyond is that Appellant should have the 
option to continue to wait for profits to be realized by 
Respondent; that receipts from the installment contract between 
Respondent and Emigration should be first used to recover its 
cost of land ($85.00 per acre), and that only then should 
Appellant get his total amount due out of one-half the gross 
profits received. Thus, the controlling provisions for payments 
to Appellant would be Sections 2 and 4 continuing until gross 
prof its were realized. Section 13 is inapplicable since it 
contemplates only an exception to Section 4 which did not arise. 
Nevertheless, Section 13 is useful as a tool in understanding the 
intentions of the contracting parties. 
In the event that the f i r st b r each of Respondent ' s 
obligation to Appellant is found to have occurred in 1970 upon 
Appellant's sale to Emigration and receipt by Respondent of the 
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$500,000.00 down payment, and it is further held that the prior 
payments to Madsen and Buehler did not toll the statute of 
limitations, it must also be found that the breach of contract 
was not singular but a repeated breach which created a new cause 
of action each time Respondent failed to pay out of the gross 
profits from each installment payment received. This reasoning 
appears consistent with Appellant's installment sale treatment of 
the 1970 sale (R. 220-222). The provisions of subsection 13(c) 
offer guidance for such an installment sale. Respondent had a 
duty to pay to Appellant the same proportion of the amount due 
him as Emigration's installment payment made to Responent bears 
to the total $2,100,000.00 purchase price. 
Installment sales are treated uniquely by statutes of 
limitation. 
In case of an obligation payment by installments, the 
statute of limitations runs against each installment 
from the time when an action might be brought to 
recover it ... [T]he rule that the statute of 
limitations begins to run against each installment 
of an obligation payable. by installments only from 
the time the installment becomes due applies although 
the debtor has the option to pay the entire in-
debtedness at any time. 
51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions §133 (1970). 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized this principle in Indian Terri-
tory Illu~inating Oil Co. v. Rosa~ond, 190 Okla. 146, 120 P.2d 
349 (1941). The court held that a continuing covenant to make 
payments when breached gives rise to a cause of action each day 
breached. 
21 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The reason for the rule is while the repeated and 
successive breaches of the implied covenant con-
tinue, the right of action for subsequent breaches 
does not accrue upon the first breach, but accrues 
and the statute begins to run as and when each 
breach occurs. Like an account not mutual in nature, 
but all on one side, the cause of action arises on 
the date of each item or breach, and the items 
within the statutory period of limitations do not draw 
after them those of longer standing. 
120 P.2d at 352-53. 
In Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. McLaughlin, 152 
C.A. 2d 911, 313 P.2d 220,223 (1957), the court ruled on a note 
payable in installments, several of which had not been paid and 
against which the statute had run. "Where money is payable in 
installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against 
the cause of action for the recovery of an unpaid installment at 
the time it is payable." 
Section 4 of the subject Agreement states that if Appellant 
had not been fully reimbursed by July 1, 1968, he was entitled to 
"receive his pro-rated share of gross prof its until he has been 
reimbursed." The sale to Emigration on May 8, 1970 was an 
installment contract. Appellant was thereby entitled to payments 
on a pro rata basis out of the 50 percent of the gross profits 
realized from each installment. If it is held that Respondent 
did not have a right to keep the first $85.00 per acre, but that 
the payments to Appellant should be proportionate to Emigration's 
installment payments, the amounts due Appellant, based on 
$11,00.00 due in 1970, are listed below: 
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Under this installment approach, even if the statute of 
limitations began to run for a breach of the contract by 
Respondent in 1970, this running would not affect the payments 
made in 1972 and 1973 since the Complaint was filed in March, 
1978. Approximately $7,986.00 is within the statute and 
accessible. 
This determination of installment contract applicability is 
one which avoids a forfeiture by Appellant. The courts are 
usually eager to construe contracts to avoid forfeitures "which 
are regarded as odius to the law." Morgan v. Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d 
428, 286 P.2d 229 (1955). In Russell v. Park City Utah Corpora-
tion, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973), this Court inferred 
that a party who seeks to enforce a forfeiture should be in 
strict compliance of forfeiture prerequisites. "(T]he general 
rule that one who seeks to invoke a forfeiture must strictly 
comply with the prerequisites thereof because forfeitures are not 
favored in the law." Al though this is not a case of contractual 
forfeiture provisions, the principle should be extended. A court 
in equity will not construe a contract in favor of a party which 
ls continually defaulted in its payments over one who has already 
given its consideration and is in danger of losing its entire 
cause of action. 
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C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE ACCRUING 
SINCE THE MATURITY DATE OF THE OBLIGATION PLUS ALL COURT 
COSTS INCURRED INCLUDING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE. 
The subject Agreement provides that Appellant receive his 
contribution of $10,00-0.00 plus 10% thereon, but includes no 
interest. This Agreement and its obligations were obviously 
intended to be satisfied and fulfilled by December 31, 1968. It 
was not anticipate~ by the contracting parties nor is it 
reasonable to assume that Respondent should have had use of 
Appellant's $10,000.00 for more than 17 years with only 10% added 
thereto. 
Utah Code Annotated, §14-1-1 (1953, as amended) provides: 
"The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or things in action shall be six percent per 
annum." This statute was amended in 1981, but the amendment has 
no effect on this obligation. The majority of ruling 
jurisdictions have supported the rule that the rate of interest 
after maturity upon an obligation, reciting a certain rate 
expressly until maturity and silent as to the rate thereafter, is 
the legal rate. 16 A.L.R. 2d 902. In Allen v. Miller, 84 N.W. 
2d 571 (N.D. 1957), the court held that a note payable without 
interest before maturity and silent as to interest after maturity 
bears interest at the legal rate from the date of default to date 
of payment or to date that judgment is entered. 
In Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 
1977), this Court commented on the availability of prejudgment 
interest: 
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As to the allowance of interest before judgment, this 
Court has heretofore spoken, and the law in Utah is 
clear, viz: where the damage is complete and the 
amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, 
and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, 
interest should be allowed from that time and not 
from the date of the judgment. 
Appellant's right to repayment in cash matured in 1973 when 
Respondent had sufficient "free" gross profits to satisfy their 
contractual obligation. If the Court finds that the Respondent 
breached its contractual obligation, Appellant is entitled to 
interest on the $11,000.00 accruing at 6% per annum from 1973 
until the entry of judgment herein. 
Appellant's right to property or the fair market value of 
same natured in February, 1978 when Appellant exercised his 
contractual option to demand 129.4 acres. If the Court decides 
that Appellant is entitled to a conveyance of property, he is 
also entitled to interest on the fair market value of that 
property as of 1978, from February, 1978 until the entry of 
judgment herein. 
Utah law is clear ~hat attorney's fees are chargeable to an 
opposing party only if there is a contractual or statutory 
liability therefor. Stubbs v. He!!!!!!.ert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 
1977). The Agreement provides: 
Should any of the parties breach this agree-
ment, and the other be required to secure legal 
counsel to enforce it, the defaulting party agrees 
to pay all court costs incurred and a reasonable 
attorney's fee for the enforcement of the agreement. 
(R. 284, paragraph 16). 
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Respondent has admitted breaching the Agreement (R. 239-241, 
paragraphs 14-17, 20). It is clear that AI?pellant was required 
to secure legal counsel to enforce the Agreement. If the Court 
finds in favor of Appellant on any of his claims, he is also 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The District Court's ruling is contrary to law and equity. 
The District Court has, without legally valid grounds, undertaken 
to relieve Respondent from the burden of a lawful and valid 
contract. 
Based on the analysis set forth above, Appellant 1s 
entitled, pursuant to the subject Agreement and his request of 
February 6, 1978, to a conveyance of 129.4 acres of the property 
known as Jeremy Ranch. Said conveyance is authorized by the 1963 
Agreement at Appellant's option 1n lieu of payments on 
Respondent's acknowledged unpaid contractual debt. Appellant's 
request, therefor, was reasonably made under the circumstances 
and was the last act required of Appellant before Respondent's 
obligation to convey matured. 
If Responent does not now have title to 129.4 acres of the 
subject property, it should be required to convey to Appellant so 
much of said property as is now in its ownership. The balance of 
his obligation should then be satisified by the payment to 
Appellant of the 1978 fair market value of so many of the 129.4 
acres which are not so conveyed. 
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In the event that Respondent is not found to be obligated to 
convey property to Appellant, Appellant is entitled to the 
acknowledged contract debt in his favor in the amount of 
$11,000.00. 
Finally, only if the Court finds that Appellant is not 
entitled to a conveyance of property and that Respondent breached 
its contractual obligations giving rise to a valid cause of 
action prior to 1973, Appellant is entitled to the proceeds of 
each installment not lost by any alleged running of the statute 
of limitations. 
In any event, Appellant is entitled to interest accruing at 
the legal rate since maturity of the obligation, all Court costs, 
and a reasonable attorney's fee incurred in these proceedings for 
the enforcement of the subject Agreement as provided in that 
Agreement. 
The District Court's judgment should be reversed and 
remanded for entry of jvdgment in favor of Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this !J day of 1982. 
<z-~ ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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